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SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION ;
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LAWS OF NEW YORK.
Introductimo.
In a commercial country the laws which regulate and pre-
serve the rights of free transmission of property and circu-
lation of wealth are of the highest importance. In propor-
tion as civilization advances and with it trade and commerce,
the great fountains of wealth, in the same proportion vill the
necessity for the free and easy circulation and transmission
of property be manifest. Without power of alienation, the
value of property to the commonwealth is small indeed. The
political necessity that conferred on the owners of property
the absolute right to dispose of the whole or a portion of the
whole of it would then forbid the exercise of that power in a
manner fatal to its enjoyment in all future times or preju-
dicial to the general interests of society.
The objects of the rules against perpetuities are to pre-
serve and guarantee the free circulation of property to a rea-
sonable extent, and yet afford mple scope for the attention
to personal and family exigencies which it is neither the
policy of the laws nor to the interest of society entirely to
overlook. With these objects in view, the Legislature of the
State of New York have enacted the following provisions :
'The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended
by any limitation or considtion whatever for a longer period
than during the continuance of not more than two lives in be-
ing at the creation of the estate, except in the single case
mentioned in the next section.' (I R. S. 8th Ed. 723, Sec. 15.)
'A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior
remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the person
to whom the first, remainder is limited shall die under the age
of twenty-one, or upon any other contingency by which the es-
tate of such person may be determined before they attain their
full age.' (1 R. S. 8th Ed. 723, Sec. 16.)
The absolute power of alienation is suspended, 'when
there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in pos-
session can be conveyed.' (1 R. 3. 8th Ed. 723, Sec. 14.)
These statutes affect all estates, interests, rights and
possibilities of every character which are capable of inter-
fering with the power of conveying the absolute fee in pos-
session, and they impose the only restrictions against tying
up estates which are imposed, except as to estates in remain-
der. Although these statutes apply to estates in remainder
as well as to all other estates, yet there are special statu-
tory provigions which apply to remainders only, and which im-
pose broader restrictions than those imposed on other estates,
and for this reason remainders will be considered separately.
For a better consideration of these statutes, as vritten above,
this branch of the subject may be divided into three parts by
the following questions :
I. What is the 'absolute power of alienation' ?
II. How long may the power be suspended ?
III. When, and on the creation of what estates, is it sus-
pended ?
A proper consideration of these questions involves near-
ly the whole question of the suspension of the power of alien-
ation ; therefore, my article will be devoted principally to
their answer in the order as written above.
I. What is the 'Absolute Power of Alienation' ?
It may be said that not all estates which are limited to
4commence upon the termination of more than two lives are void.
On the contrary, an estate may be limited to commence upon the
termination of any number of lives, provided that the absolute
power of alienation is not suspended. It is, therefore, of
the greatest importance to know accurately what is meant by
the terms 'absolute power of alienation."
The statute provides that the absolute power of aliena-
tion is suspended, 'when there are no persons in being by whom
an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.' (1 R. S. 8th
Ed. 723, Sec. 14.) The statutes further provide that all ex-
pectant estates are alienable, descendible and devisable. (I
R. S. 8th Ed. 725, Sec. 35.) Now, since all expectant estates
are alienable as well as estates in possession, it follows
therefore that no matter how many different estates a fee is
carved into, whether present or future, vested or contingent,
as long as there is in being a representative for each estate,
who, if he wishes, is capable of alienating the interest rep-
resented by him, there can be no suspension ; for, by the
union of all, an absolute fee may be conveyed.
In order that an interest in property may be alienated,
it is not necessary that such interest be indefeasibly vested.
It is sufficient if the person to whom the interest will pass,
5upon the happening of the contingency which vests the inter-
est in the land in him, is in being and capable of alienating;
for, by the joining of the two, an absolute indefeasible in-
terest may be conveyed.
II. How long may the Power of Alienation be Suspended ?
The period during which the statute allows suspension of
the absolute power of alienation is 'two lives in being at
the creation of the estate", with the single exception that,
va contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior re-
mainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the person to
whom the first remainder is limited shall die under the age of
twenty-one, or upon any other contingency by which the estate
of such person may be determined before they attain their full
age.' (1 R. S. 8th Ed. 723, Sec. 15, 16.)
In this State the question is not settled as to whether
the existence of the certainty that a contingency will happen
within two lives in being, as required by the statute, is de-
termined by the facts as they existed at the time of making
the will or at the death of the testator. The question turns
upon the construction of the words 'the creation of the es-
tate', as found in the statute. Thus, for instance, an es-
tate is limited by will to take effect after the termination
of four lives, during which time there is a suspension of the
power of alienation. During the time between the making of
the will and the testator's death two of the four persons die.
Is the term of suspension valid because measured by two lives
at the testator's death, or is it void because at the time of
making the will if the testator had then died the will would
have been void ? The statutory provisions on the subject are
as follows : "The delivery of the grant, when an expectant
estate is createdA d where it is created by devise, the death
of the testator, shall be deemed the time of the creation of
the estate.' (1 R. S. 8th Ed. 728, Sec. 128.) The English
rule, and better opinion, seems to be that the facts as they
exist at the death of the testator should be the criterion for
determining the validity of the gift. The statute appears to
regard only the situation as it exists at the testator's death,
for 'the creation of the estate" takes place at his death and
the lives must be thn in being. Besides, this is in harmony
with the general principle that a will speaks as of the date
of the testator's death.
In all cases the suspension must be bounded strictly by
two lives. It is not enough that the provisions of an in-
strument are such that the suspension may terminate at the end
of two lives. The rule is settled that any limitation is
void, as in violation of the statute, by which the suspension
of the power of alienation will not necessarily, under all
possible circumstances, terminate within the prescribed pe-
riod. The fact that by the happening of subsequent events
the suspension would not be beyond two lives would not render
the limitation valid, but where a limitation is made to take
effect upon two alternative events, one of which is too re-
mote, and the other valid as within the prescribed limits, al-
though such limitation is void, as far as it depends upon the
remote event, it will be allowed to take effect upon the hap-
pening of the alternate one, as long as it can be determined
as to which state of facts will exist within two lives in be-
ing.
Although the term must be measured by lives, it need not
continue throughout two complete lives, and a suspension for
part of a life exhausts the privilege as completely as though
an entire life had been named. For instance, a suspension
during the minorities of A and I, is a suspension for two
lives.
It is not necessary that a term be measured in every case
by lives. Any other measure may be employed. Thus, an es-
tate may be limited to take effect after the lapse of ten
years. But in every case there must be a controlling pro-
vision that in any event the term must terminate within two
designated lives. For example, an estate to the unborn child
of A, to take effect after the lapse of ten years, unless soon-
er terminated by the death of B and C.
The statute further requires that the lives shall be 'in
being' at the creation of the estate, but it is not necessary
that both of the lives be specifically designated at the crea-
tion of the estate, as long as both of the lives are in be-
ing. There can be no uncertainty, however, as to one of the
two lives, and the other must be capable of ascertainment upon
or before the termination of the one. There are some cases,
however, that the courts hold are not within the reason or
policy of the rule that the term shall be measured by lives
in being. Thus, in the case of Roberts v. C (98 N.Y.
239), it was held that a direction in a will that the sale of
the testator's real estate should be made at public auction,
after three weeks' notice by publication in newspapers, does
9not suspend the power of alienation within the meaning of the
statute, but was a mere prudential arrangement to secure a
fair sale and prevent a sacrifice. It was not at such sus-
pensions that the statute was aimed.
III. When, and on the Creation of what Estates
is the Power of Alienation Suspended ?
When the statutes against the suspension of the power of
alienation were first enacted it was thought that they applied
only to future contingent estates, and it was so stated by the
Revisers in their notes, but in the case of Eeitt v. Everitt
(29 N. Y. 39), the court recognized two ways in which there
might be a suspension. The Judge, in the opinion, says :
'The suspension, which it is the purpose of the statute to
limit, may be effected by one of two methods,-- either by pro-
viding for the creation of future estates, to take effect upon
the happening of some prospective event, the occurrence of
which is essential to the vesting of such future estate, or
by conveying the estate to trustees upon some authorized
trust.' Later, in the case of Radey. v. Kh (97 11. Y. 35),
ga~r
Judge Rapello shows4there is a third way by which there may
be a suspension of the power of alienation ; v. by the cre-
ation of an estate subject to a power in trust which tempora-
rily prohibits a sale where the title is vested in persons who
are not able to convey the land and thus destroy the power.
These three methods of suspension have now become well recog-
nized in the cases, and will be considered in their order.
First, suspension occasioned by future contingencies.
The statutory provisions as to contingent estates are as fol-
lows : 'Future estates are either vested or contingent. They
are vested when there is a person in being who would have an
immediate right to the possession of the lands upon the ceas-
ing of the intermediate or precedent estate. They are con-
tingent whilst the person to whom or the event upon which they
are limited to take effect remains uncertain.' (1 R. S. 8th
Ed. 723.) There are thus two cases in which the estate is
contingent : Ist, where the uncertainty is as to the person ;
and, 2d, where the uncertainty is as to the event. In the
last case, although the event is uncertain, yet the person
who, either personally or by his heirs as such, will take the
remainder if it ever vests at all, is ascertained. Now it
has been seen that expectant estates are alienable, and that
the test in every case is whether the person who will event-
ually come into possession of the estate upon the happening
of the contingency is ain 2. If he is, then there is no
suspension of the power of alienation ; for, as the persons
are in being and ascertained who, if the contingency happens,
will take either personally or by their heirs as such, these
persons may convey to the same person to whom the holders of
the vested estates also convey, and the common grantee aould
thus receive an absolute fee. As to contingencies of the
f class, however, it is readily seen that they are, from
the necessity of the case, inalienable. As long as the per-
son who will take the estate upon the happening of the con-
tingency is unascertained, there is no one who can release his
interest and thus convey an absolute indefeasible fee.
The next class of cases is suspension occasioned by ex-
press trusts. In this class, suspension arises only from
the fact that alienation is forbidden by the instrument cre-
ating the trust, or by statute. Section 55, Title 2, Chap.
1, Part II, of the Revised Statutes provides that express
trusts may be created for the following purposes :
'l. To sell land for the benefit of creditors.
"2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit
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of legatees or for the purpose of satisfying any charge there-
on.
'3. To receive the rents and profits of lands and apply
them to the use of any person during the life of such person,
or for any shorter term, subject to the rules against the sus-
pension of the power of alienation.
"4. To receive the rents and profits of land and to ac-
cumulate the same for the purposes and within the limits pre-
scribed in Article I.'
In the first class of trusts allowed by statute, as writ-
ten above, it is obvious that there can be no suspension of
the power of alienation, unless the donor of the power of sale
expressly stipulates that the land shall not be sold until
after the lapse of a prescribed period. If the power of sale
is postponed by the terms of the instrument, it should not be
postponed beyond two lives in being, and should be limited
expressly upon lives. But not every trust to sell property
which is to be exercised after a definite term is an illegal
restraint upon alienation. When a beneficiary under a power
is also vested with the title to the real estate a heir or
devisee, he may, before the power has been or could be exer-
cised, convey the real estate by warranty deed, and thus de-
feat or annul the power of sale.
In trusts of the second class it becomes important to dis-
tinguish trusts to pay annuities, which do not occasion sus-
pension, and a trust to apply an income, which belongs to the
third class and which always occasions suspension. From a
consideration of the cases, the distinction seems to be as
follows : Where a trustee is directed to receive the rents
and profits and apply or pay them over a, such, the trust be-
longs to the third class. But where he is directed to pay a
specific sum of money as such, and not as rents and profits,
and whether in one lump sum or in successive specified lump
suMs, the trust belongs to the second class and the gift is
either a legacy in the usual sense or an annuity, according
to circumstances.
Trusts of the third class invariably occasion suspension
of the power of alienation, for their very purpose and essence
is that the property shall not be alienated. It is to this
effect that the statute provides that 'no person beneficially
interested in a trust for the receipt of the rents or profits
of lands can assign or in any manner dispose of such inter-
est.' (1 R. S. 8th Ed. 730, Sec. 63.) Also, in speaking of
the same trust, the statute provides that 'when the trust
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shall be expressed in the instrument creating the estate, ev-
ery sale, conveyance or other act of the trustees in contra-
vention of the trust shall be absolutely void." (1 H. S. 8th
Ed. 731, Sec. 65.) It follows that all trusts to which these
provisions apply necessarily suspend the absolute power of
alienation.
Trusts of the fourth class must conform in every respect
to the general provisions of the statute authorizing such ac-
cumulations, and must begin within the time permitted for the
vesting of future estates. Accumulations of the rents and
profits of land for the benefit of minors, to be paid to them
upon their reaching their majority, occasion a suspension of
the power of alienation during the period of such accumula-
tions. But in the case of & v. iuhn (67 N. Y. 35),
where a direction was made in a will to accumulate a certain
gross sum to be paid to the beneficiaries upon their attain-
ing their majority, the court held that it did not render the
estate inalienable, for the interest of the cestui i trust
was assignable, the trust being for the payment of a sum in
gross. The court said : "Where the sole object of the trust
is to pay a sum in gross, by collecting and accumulating rents,
etc., to a specific amount, the Ieit i=e trusmay release
or assign. The case come within the last part of the fol-
lowing statute : 'No person beneficially interested in a
trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of land can
assign or in any manner dispose of such interest ; but the
rights and interests of every person for whose benefit a trust
for the payment of a stun in gross is created are assignable.'
(1 R. S. 8th Ed. 730, Sec. 63.)
A third class of cases in which there is a suspension of
the power of alienation is where estates are subject to powers
in trust which temporarily prohibit a sale, and where the ti-
tle is vested in persons not able to convey the land and thus
destroy the power. "A power is an authority to do some act
in relation to lands or the creation of estates therein which
the owner granting or reserving such power might himself law-
fully perform.' (I R. S. 8th Ed. 723.) Powers are either
beneficial or in trust. They are beneficial when no person
other than the grantee has by the terms of the creation any
interest in its execution. They are in trust when any per-
son or class or persons other than the grantee of such power
is designated as entitled to the proceeds or other benefits
to result from the alienation of the lands, according to the
power. Every power in trust, unless its execution or non-
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execution is made expressly to depend on the will of the gran-
tee, is imperative and imposes a duty on the grantee, the per-
formance of which may be compelled in equity for the benefit
of the parties interested. (1 R. 3. 8th Ed. 734, Sec. 94, 95t
96.)
In beneficial powers there are statutory provisions as
to such powers, by which the exercise of such a power may be
compelled for the benefit of creditors. This is true, even
where future estates are limited to take effect in the event
that the power was not exercised by the beneficiary. Or,
again, the beneficiary may at any time exercise the power him-
self. If the beneficiary is only empowered to sell less than
a fee, then he and those in whom the fee is vested may convey
an absolute fee. It is thus obvious that in powers of this
kind there can be no suspension of the power of alienation.
It would seem that whenever under a power in trust the
beneficiary is also vested with the title to the real estate,
as the heir or devisee, he may, before the power has been or
could be exercised, convey the real estate by warranty deed
and thus defeat or annul the power of sale. Thus, in the
case of Hetzel v. Barber (69 N. Y. 1), a woman gave by will
a certain piece of real property to her two daughters ; the
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husband was authorized to sell and convey it, and in case of
sale was directed to invest the daughters' portions of the
proceeds and keep the same invested, to be paid to them, with
the accumulations of interest, when they severally reached the
age of twenty-five years. Before the daughters reached the
age of twenty-five years, but after they had attained their
majority, they deeded away the property for an adequate con-
sideration. The court held that as there was no limitation
on their right to convey, and as upon such conveyance they
ceased to have any interest in the execution of the power
which was created solely for their benefit, and which could
only thereafter be executed for the benefit of the defendant,
the conveyance extinguished the power and a subsequent convey-
ance in execution of it would be inoperative, for the bene-
ficiaries had ceased to have any interest in the power, and
as the power could be exercised only for their benefit, when
their interest ceased the power became annulled. Thus it is
seen that in powers of this kind, although the donee is in-
structed not to sell until the lapse of a definite period,
still there is no suspension of the power of alienation, for
there are persons in being who can convey an absolute fee.
A general power of sale will not occasion suspension, for
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by the terms of the power an absolute fee may be conveyed at
any time. Where there is a power to sell lands and to pay
over the proceeds to a trustee at some future time, if the
trust, is one where the cesuii trus cannot alien his in-
terest in the trust, it is obvious that during the period be-
fore the funds are paid over to the trustee, as well as after-
wards, the power of conveying an absolute fee is suspended.
go that if a power of sale was directed to be exercised after
the lapse of a fixed future time, and was not limited by lives,
such power would be illegal as against the statute forbidding
perpetuities. Also, where there is a power to sell and to
pay over the proceeds to persons to be ascertained in the fu-
ture, until such persons are ascertained, an absolute fee can-
not be conveyed ; for the persons beneficially interested can
not release their interests until it can be ascertained just
whom those persons will be.
The courts have held that powers may be created for the
express purpose of obviating a suspension of the power of
alienation, which otherwise would exist if the power was not
created. For instance, if an estate should be created which
would suspend the power of alienation beyond the statutory
period, and if in connection with the creation of such an es-
19
tate an untrEmnelled power is also granted to another, under
which the property involved may at any time be absolutely
alienable, it cannot be said that there are no persons in be-
ing capable of conveying an absolute fee.
Remainders.
As has before been mentioned, the statutes against il-
legally suspending the power of alienation extend to all es-
tates, rights, interests and possibilities, and impose the
only restraint upon the disposition of property that is im-
posed, with the single exception of remainders. I will now
consider the definition of 'remainders'. and what additional
requirements are imposed in estates of this kind.
A remainder is a future estate in lands which is prece-
ded and supported by a particular estate in possession, which
takes effect immediately upon the determination of the prior
estate, and which is created at the same time and by the same
conveyance. (Tiedeman on Real Property, p. 311.) If the
future estate does not take effect in possession immediately
upon the expiration of the prior estate, it is not a remain-
20
der, nor is not considered as such under the statutes we are
about to consider.
The statutory provisions in regard to remainders are as
follows :
'A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term of
years, unless the contingency on which it is limited be such
that the remainder m vest in interest during the contin-
uance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of
such remainder or upon the termination thereof.' (1 R. S.
8th Ed. 724, Sec. 24.)
'Successive estates for life shall not be limited, unless
to persons in being at the creation thereof, and where a re-
mainder shall be limited on more than two successive estates
for life, all the estates subsequent to those of the two per-
sons first entitled thereto shall be void, and upon the death
of those persons the remainder shall take effect in the same
manner as if no other life estate had been created.' (1 R. S.
8th Ed. 724, Sec. 17.)
'A fee may be limited on a fee upon a contingency, which
if it should occur must happen within the statutory period.'
(1 R. S. 8th Ed. 724, Sec. 24.)
'A contingent remainder in fee may be created upon a
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prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the
persons to whom the first remainder is limited shall die under
the age of twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency by
which the estate of such persons may be determined before they
attain their full age.' (1 R. 3. 8th Ed. 723, Sec. 16.)
It will be noticed that these statutes require that the
other remainder shall 'vest' within the statutory period, in-
stead of providing that the 'power of alienation' shall not
be suspended. It thus becomes important to ascertain what
vesting satisfies the statute. There are three ways in which
the term is used :
1. Vested in possession. An estate is in possession
where the owner has an immediate right to the possession of
the land. (I R. S. 8th Ed. 723.)
2. Vested in interest, where there is a present fixed
right, to an estate to be enjoyed in the future. For example
an estate to A for life ; the remainder to J, in fee.
3. A vested right to a contingent estate. Here the
estate in question is not in itself vested at all, either in
possession or interest. The estate is contingent, but the
right to take it in possession, ai it ever does vest at all,
is a vested right.
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Vesting in interest is the requirement which the statute
imposes. The remainder may, however, vest either absolutely
or defeasibly ; either form of vesting in interest is suf-
ficient. If it, is defeasibly vested, the defeasance clause
must be limited to take effect within the statutory period,
otherwise it, will be of no effect and will vest absolutely.
It will be seen that the requirements as to remainders
are broader than the provisions against suspension of the pow-
er of alienation, for the reason that all that is required in
order that the alienation shall not be suspended is that there
be persons in being who are capable of joining and conveying
an absolute fee ; a vested right to a future contingent es-
tate would be sufficient to give the party having such inter-
est a power to alienate or release his interest. But in re-
mainders, a vested right to a contingent estate is not suf-
ficient ; it must be vested in interest within the statutory
period in order to satisfy the statutes. As regards succes-
sive life estates, however, the rule is still more strict,
for simply vesting is not enough. here the statute absolute-
ly forbids more than two successive life estates, even though
all the estates are vested in interest.
The term during which the vesting of remainders may be
postponed is two lives in being, with but one single excep-
tion, which allows an additional measure of the term, and
that is where a contingent remainder in fee is created on a
prior remainder in fee. This extension of time is limited
to but one case, and that is where the preceding fee is itself
a remainder which has been limited, either to an infant or to
a person unborn, and such remainder has taken effect after the
vesting has already been postponed for two lives. Now, with-
out special authority by statute, the vesting must after such
a limitation have been absolute, but the statute comes in and
provides that where such a remainder is given to a minor, a
further limitation may be made, to take effect in case the
person to whom the first remainder is limited shall die under
the age of twenty-one, and that such further limitation shall
be valid.

